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WHOSE CONSTITUTION IS IT? WHY FEDERALISM AND
CONSTITUTIONAL POSITIVISM DON'T MIX
JAMES A. GARDNER*

INTRODUCTION

Ever since state constitutional law arrived as a field of study
twenty years ago, its most pressing and contentious problem has
concerned the question of how state constitutions ought to be
interpreted, and in particular whether the appropriate methods for
interpreting a state constitution differ from those commonly
employed in analyzing the federal Constitution.' In the course of
this ongoing debate, it has frequently been argued that state
constitutions ought to be interpreted using a methodology of strict
constitutional positivism. I shall define "constitutional positivism"
more formally below. For now, it is sufficient to say that constitutional positivism is, broadly speaking, a familiar and commonplace
theory of interpretational legitimacy that requires courts to
approach a constitution as an authoritative expression of the will
of the people who made it, and to interpret the constitution strictly
in accordance with that popular will as it is expressed in the
document. I shall argue, in this Article, that the interpretational
methodology of constitutional positivism, which furnishes the
dominant approach to the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution,
cannot simply be lifted from federal constitutional law and applied
willy-nilly to state constitutions. Although it is possible, and
* Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Faculty Scholar, State University of New
York, University at Buffalo Law School. This paper was originally prepared for a conference
on "Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms," co-sponsored by the College of William &
Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, and the National Center for State Courts, in
Williamsburg, Virginia, on November 14, 2003. I wish to thank Bob Williams and Hans
Linde for especially valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.
1. For an overview of state constitutional interpretation, see G. ALAN TARR,
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 173-209 (1998).
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perhaps desirable, to adapt the methods of constitutional positivism
to the interpretation of state constitutions, substantial modifications must be made before such methods can be used successfully
in this very different setting.
In their strongest statements, advocates of a state constitutional
jurisprudence of constitutional positivism sometimes argue that
only the narrowest positivist approaches to constitutional interpretation, such as textualism ' or originalism,3 should be applied to
state constitutions. But even in its most general and moderate
formulations, advocates of strict positivist approaches are united by
a methodological belief that the job of the interpreter is, essentially,
to pay really close and exclusive attention to the state constitution
and its unique and exclusive interpretational props-its text, the
intentions of its framers, its relevant history, and so on. Certainly,
an interpreter proceeding in the strict positivist mode would have
no business relying on the text, framers' intentions, or founding
history of any other constitution; the central tenet of constitutional
positivism is that the only constitution that is relevant for purposes
of interpretation is the one under consideration, along with its
unique associated body of interpretational aids.
Sometimes a jurisprudence of state constitutional positivism is
justified on the ground that, because state constitutions are so
easily and frequently amended, it is often possible to discern "the
framers' true intent"4 in a way that is sometimes impossible to
accomplish when interpreting the U.S. Constitution due to its age.
Thus, the argument goes, whatever its potential flaws as a tool of
federal constitutional interpretation, a jurisprudence of original
intent can be effective when applied to state constitutions. Others
2. Textualism holds that, in most cases and for most purposes, the meaning of a
constitutional provision can and should be discerned by examining the text alone. See, e.g.,
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the OriginalUnderstanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204,20509 (1980) (examining the method and rationale of textualism).
3. Originalism holds that the meaning of a constitutional provision can and should be
adduced by examining the intentions of the provision's framers and ratifiers. For a good
overview of originalism, see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989). On the link between originalism and constitutional
positivism, see James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundationsof Originalism:An Account
and Critique,71 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1991).
4. Vito J. Titone, State ConstitutionalInterpretation:The Search for an Anchor in a
Rough Sea, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 431, 460 (1987); see also TARR, supranote 1, at 196.
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have argued that the tendency of state constitutions to regulate a
wide variety of governmental activities in great detail makes many
provisions of state constitutions unsuitable for any kind of analysis
other than a purely textual one.5 More generally, though, constitutional positivism is typically defended on the ground that it is the
only sound methodology for interpreting any constitution, whether
state or national. This is the view taken by adherents of what has
come to be known as the "primacy" approach to state constitutional
interpretation,6 and it is the view that I want primarily to dispute.
A frequently-expressed frustration in the field of state constitutional law is that state courts often fail to follow the prescribed
methodology of constitutional positivism: they ignore subtle (and
sometimes not-so-subtle) cues contained in the state constitutional
text; they fail to inquire into the views of the state constitution's
framers; and they undertake no meaningful investigation into the
history of their state or the development of its constitution.7
Instead, state courts frequently look to federal constitutional law
for guidance: they examine the text of the U.S. Constitution, the
5. See, e.g., William F. Swindler, State Constitutionsfor the 20th Century, 50 NEB. L.
REV. 577, 593 (1971). For similar views, see TARR, supra note 1, at 195; James Gray Pope,
An Approach to State ConstitutionalInterpretation,24 RUTGERs L.J. 985, 1004-05 (1993).
6. Some of the leading works in this school of thought include Hans A. Linde, E
Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984) [hereinafter
Linde, E Pluribus]; Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980) [hereinafter Linde, First Things First]; Robert F.
Williams, In the Supreme Court'sShadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court
Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv. 353 (1984) [hereinafter Williams, In the Supreme
Court's Shadow]; Robert F. Williams, Methodology Problems in Enforcing State
ConstitutionalRights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 143 (1987) [hereinafter Williams, Methodology
Problems].
7. For examples of state courts ignoring textual differences, see Reid v. Gholson, 327
S.E.2d 107 (Va. 1985) (ignoring considerable textual differences between the religion clauses
of the First Amendment and VA. CONST. art. I, § 16). See also, e.g., State v. Ceci, 255 A.2d 700
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1969) (ignoring the fact that DEL. CONST. art. I, § 5 protects only the freedom
of the press, and treating it as though it also contained a speech clause); Ramada Inns, Inc.
v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., No. 83C-AU-56, 1988 Del. Super. LEXIS 29 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb.
9, 1988) (ignoring the fact that DE. CONST. art. I, § 5 protects only the freedom of the press
and treating it as though it also contained a speech clause). On the failure of state courts to
inquire into the intentions of the framers or make other historical inquiry, see James A.
Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 793-94
(1992). On the inept analysis by state courts of constitutional history, see Jack L. Landau,
A Judge'sPerspectiveon the Use andMisuse of History in State ConstitutionalInterpretation,
38 VAL. U. L. REV. 451 (2004).
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writings of Madison, Hamilton, and other key Framers of the
federal Constitution; and rely heavily on decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court.8 Sometimes state courts seem to assume that the
meaning of state constitutional provisions is given more by national
sources of constitutional meaning than by any distinctive attributes
of the state constitution itself, and they thus incorporate federal
constitutional doctrine wholesale into state constitutional jurisprudence.' Although this practice has been the subject of frequent and
intense criticism,' 0 I shall argue that it is in fact often a logical
response to the situation in which judicial interpreters of state
constitutions find themselves, in large part because orthodox
constitutional positivism simply is not a viable interpretational
methodology for subnational constitutions in a federal system.
The application of constitutional positivism to state constitutions
has been criticized before, most often by invoking interpretational
models that challenge the conceptual foundations of constitutional
positivism itself. Critiques by Professors Kahn and Friedman, for
example, proceed from a dialogic model of constitutional meaning,1
and Professor Robert Schapiro has offered a theory of state
constitution making that abandons reliance on an intentional
correspondence between a self-conscious polity and its governing

8. See Linde, E Pluribus,supra note 6, at 186-88; Linde, First Things First,supranote
6, at 387-92; Todd F. Simon, Independent but Inadequate:State Constitutionsand Protection
of Freedom of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 308 (1985).
9. For an overview of this process, see Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting
FederalConstitutionalDoctrine:Case-by-CaseAdoptionism or ProspectiveLockstepping?, 46
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1499 (2005) [hereinafter Williams, State Courts].
10. See Williams, In the Supreme Court'sShadow, supranote 6, at 389-97; see also TARR,
supra note 1, at 180-82; Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing
Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights
Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1064 (1997) [hereinafter Williams, In the Glare]
(concluding that "state courts can and should have coherent, independent doctrines
surrounding their state constitutional provisions").
11. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Interpretationand Authority in State Constitutionalism,106
HARv. L. REV. 1147 (1993); see also, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, The ConstitutionalValue of
Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93 (2000). Similar
points are made in Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1219-20
(1994); Rachel A. Van Cleave, State ConstitutionalInterpretationand Methodology, 28 N.M.
L. REV. 199, 203-05 (1998). For an earlier, related example, see Robert M. Cover & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035 (1977).

20051

WHOSE CONSTITUTION IS IT?1

1249

constitutional document. 12 While these critiques are useful and
potent, the one I offer here is different in that it preserves the basic
assumptions and conceptual structure of constitutional positivism,
which is after all a very good theory-in our time, the preeminent
theory-on which to sustain and legitimize indirect, republican
democracy. What I wish to show, however, is that the premises of
constitutional positivism cannot, except with substantial modification, be coherently applied to the constitutions of the American
states.
Part I of this Article sets out the political theory of constitutional
positivism and its attendant ideology of interpretation. Part II turns
to the federal structure of American government, and argues that
the status of subnational units in a true federal system violates the
conditions necessary to justify the interpretational methods of
constitutional positivism. Part III draws out some of the implications of this disjunction for state constitutional interpretation, and
Part IV concludes by examining some potential complications of my
analysis.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL POSITIVISM

The basic theory of constitutional positivism is Lockean, and it
tells a familiar story about the significance of constitutions and the
source of their legitimacy as fundamental law. According to this
story, autonomous individuals, self-ruling in the state of nature as
a matter of natural law, agree voluntarily for their own mutual
security and advantage to band together into a civil society. 3 In so
doing, each member of the society gives up his or her natural right
of self-rule to the collective group. Having thus entered into a selfgoverning society, society's members-now known as "the people"-generally find it advantageous to create a government to
handle the chores associated with collective self-rule. The government, on this view, is thus no more than a servant or agent of the
people, and can exercise only the powers that have been delegated
12. Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretationin State ConstitutionalLaw, 84 VA.
L. REV. 389, 441-56 (1998).
13. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 4,48-50, 87,89 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1952) (1690).
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by the people, and then only in a way that the people have authorized. 1 4 A government that has been duly appointed by the people
and acts within the bounds of its delegated powers is "legitimate"-it has the right, and not merely the power, to make laws
binding on society. A constitution, on this view, is simply a positive
statement of the instructions of the principal (the people) to its
agents (the government), and that is why government officials must
strictly obey and implement the will of the people as it is expressed
in their constitution." This is, of course, the familiar story of the
American founding, one that is told and retold in the canonical
texts of American law.' 6 It provides, in Eugene Rostow's words, "the
prevailing political theory of modern times and the only modern
rival for the doctrine that power proceeds from the barrel of a
gun,"' 7 and it furnishes the theoretical foundations of constitutionalism itself. To a very great extent, we are all constitutional
positivists.
The political theory of constitutional positivism also provides an
accompanying theory of legitimate constitutional interpretation.
Because the constitution contains the positive and binding instructions of the people, judges, who are themselves only specialized
public servants, must construe the constitution consistent with the
will of those who made it. Consequently, according to constitutional
positivism, judicial review consists in the main of an attempt to
discern and faithfully to enforce the will of those who made and
adopted the constitution. 8
Nevertheless, just because constitutional positivism provides the
central narrative account of the U.S. Constitution does not necessarily make it the best account of state constitutions. Constitutional
positivism makes a number of critical assumptions about the nature
of the polity and its relation to its constitution, three of which are
14.
15.
judges
16.

Id. at §§ 134-142.
Originalism, for example, is only one very strong account of what is necessary for
to assure their obedience to the popular will. See Gardner, supra note 3, at 21-22.
See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. pmbl.;

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
17. Eugene V. Rostow, The Rightful Limits of Freedom in a LiberalDemocraticState: Of
Civil Disobedience, in IS LAW DEAD? 39, 48 (Eugene V. Rostow ed., 1971).
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466-69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-76 (1803).
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relevant here. Under constitutional positivism, the polity that
creates the constitution must have three characteristics: it must be
(1) unique, (2) determinate, and (3) self-constructed.
The uniqueness requirement assures a one-to-one correspondence between a polity and its constitution. Under the constraints
of Lockean political theory, there can be only one people, one
government (or perhaps one collection of governments), and
consequently one set of instructions from principal to agent. By
definition, on this view, it is not possible for one people to give
binding instructions to another people's government, nor would a
government be acting legitimately were it to obey instructions
issued by some people other than the one that created it and to
which it owes obedience. Thus, we would not expect the Supreme
Court of Canada to obey commands contained in the U.S. Constitution, nor could Americans legitimately harbor any expectation that
Canadians will obey the U.S. Constitution, either in lieu of or in
addition to their own.
The closely related determinacy criterion requires that it be
clear who comprises the polity that is entitled to issue binding
commands to any particular governmental agent. In a regime of
constitutional positivism there must be one, and only one,
principal-but who is it? For constitutional positivism to function
effectively, a government must be able to identify with some
precision who is and who is not a member of the unique polity
entitled to issue it instructions, knowledge that permits it to know
exactly where-that is to say, in what constitution-its unique set
of binding instructions may be found.'9 It is not enough for a court
to know that it is, say, the agent of the people of Italy, or of
Argentina, if there is any significant question about who comprises
the members of those polities. The most familiar kinds of indeterminacy problems appear when nations begin to break down; for
example, officials of the Yugoslavian government in the mid-1990s
19. The kind of uncertainty referred to must be distinguished from the normal kinds of
uncertainty that, in Lockean theory, nearly always accompany any attempt to identify with
precision the membership of a given polity. For example, in- and out-migration, the status
of resident aliens, and problems arising from the intergenerational transmission of consent
may all complicate questions of political membership. These kinds of problems, however, are
endemic in contractarian political theory and are not generally thought to pose
insurmountable problems.
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might have known that they owed obedience to the Yugoslavian
people and their constitution, but have been thoroughly confused as
to who comprised that people, and just which constitution contained
the instructions that Yugoslavian officials were required to obey.
Similar problems have arisen in some of the Commonwealth
countries as they have gradually disengaged themselves from
British oversight.2 °
Finally, according to constitutional positivism, a polity must be
self-constructed, meaning that its members, and they alone, must
be the ones who decide to form an independent civil society and to
create constitutional rules for their collective self-governance. A
basic premise of Lockean theory is that a group forms its own civil
society to take itself out of the larger world, to create a selfcontained enclave of complete self-sovereignty. For such a transaction to be meaningful, the decision of the members to constitute
themselves a polity must be voluntary and rational-done, that is,
on their own volition and not, say, at the instigation of some other
group. Operation of this requirement may occasionally be seen in
the international community's refusal to recognize new nations
when it suspects that they have been formed less than fully
voluntarily, for example, under pressure from outside forces. The
former South African Bantustans fit this description, 2 ' and the
20. A particularly acute example of this problem arose upon Southern Rhodesia's
unilateral declaration of independence from Britain in 1965. Courts sitting in the former
colony owed their existence to a 1961 colonial constitution conferred by Britain, yet were
permitted to continue to sit pursuant to Rhodesia's 1965 revolutionary constitution. This
presented difficult problems of constitutional pedigree for the judges. See F.M. Brookfield,
The Courts,Kelsen, and the Rhodesian Revolution, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 326, 328 (1969). The
same problem, though in a very different context, has arisen in Canada, for which there is
no clearly identifiable event marking the moment when it ceased to be a British colony and
became an independent nation. Instead, Canada has acquired independence from Britain in
a slow, evolutionary process. Moreover, Canada has never formally adopted a constitution;
the Canadian constitution consists of a mix of statutes, common law, and customary
practices, many of which, including the constitution's centerpiece, the 1867 British North
America Act, date to the era of British rule. See generally PETER H. RUSSELL,
CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS BECOME ASOVEREIGN PEOPLE? (1992) (recounting
Canadian constitutional history). According to Russell, as recently as the 1960s, when the
Canadian constitution was still formally the product of British statutory law, "Canadians had
not yet been able to agree on the locus of constitutional sovereignty in the nation they were
endeavouring to build." Id. at 57.
21. See John Dugard, South Africa's "Independent" Homelands: An Exercise in
Denationalization,10 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POLY 11, 11-16 (1980); see also BRIAN BUNTING,
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same principle helps explain why Native American reservations are
not understood to be truly independent nations.
The conditions of uniqueness, determinacy, and self-construction,
then, are necessary to justify interpreting a constitution using
the methods of constitutional positivism. These are exactly the
conditions, however, that American state polities fail to satisfy,
and which indeed cannot be satisfied, by any subnational unit in a
system of true federalism, as in the American case.
II. FEDERALISM AND SUBNATIONAL UNITS: WHOSE
CONSTITUTION IS IT?

A. SubnationalAutonomy
In any multilevel system of governance-in any system, that is,
other than a completely centralized and unitary one-the relationship between the national and subnational units of government
may range across a potentially broad spectrum of subnational
autonomy. At one end of the spectrum, a subnational unit may
possess complete or very nearly complete autonomy and consequent
independence from the national government. This is the arrangement that might prevail in a treaty league or a confederacy, such as
existed in the United States under the Articles of Confederation.2 2
At the other end of the spectrum, subnational units may occupy a
status of complete or very nearly complete subordination to the
national government, and thus enjoy virtually no meaningful
autonomy. This would be the situation in a highly centralized
government with a system of strict hierarchical decentralization, as
for example with the ddpartements of France.2"
Federalism, at least when it is genuine rather than merely
nominal, 4 sits uneasily in the middle of this spectrum. In a truly
THE RISE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REICH 309-16 (1964).

22. See NORMAN DORSEN ETAL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 352 (2003) (describing
the central government under the Articles of Confederation).
23. Id.
24. The charge is sometimes made that American federalism has degenerated from a
system of genuine federalism to a merely nominal one that is much closer to a centralized
national system. See, e.g., ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 5

(2001).
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federal system, subnational units are partly dependent and partly
independent; partly autonomous and partly subordinate. A subnational unit's autonomy may be restricted territorially or by area
of competence, or both; residuary powers may be allocated to the
national government or to the subnational units.2 5 Whatever the
precise arrangement, in all such cases the people of the subnational
unit have the authority to govern themselves as they see fit in some
instances, but not in all instances. They are autonomous sovereigns
for some purposes but not for others, or with respect to some
subjects but not others. A subnational unit in a federal system is
thus simultaneously an independent, autonomously self-governing
entity, guided solely by the independently formulated wishes of its
own polity, and a hierarchically subordinate dependency of the
national government, required to adhere to decisions made by a
national polity that is essentially external to it, even when its own
polity would, if given the chance, choose some other course.
B. Joint Ownership of State Constitutions
The indeterminate status of subnational units in a federal
system calls into question the extent to which their constitutions
can be viewed in the positive sense. A useful heuristic for framing
this inquiry is to consider the question: whose constitution is it? If
constitutional positivism is to be available as a theoretical framework for an interpretational methodology, the answer must be that
a state's constitution "belongs"-uniquely, determinately, and by
virtue of a process of independent and voluntary self-construction-to the people of that state, and to them alone. Yet it is clear
that the constitutions of the American states cannot satisfy this
definition. If we ask to whom does the constitution of an American
state belong, we must conclude that the best answer, at least from
the point of view of constitutional positivism, is that a state
constitution belongs jointly to the polities of both the state and the
nation.
25. For overviews of subnational autonomy in federal systems around the world, see
CHESTER JAMEs ANTIEAU, STATES' RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS (1984); Ronald
L. Watts, Foreword: States, Provinces, Ldnder, and Cantons:InternationalVariety Among
Subnational Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 941 (2000).
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This property of joint ownership shows up most obviously in the
basic fact that the federal Constitution establishes the outer
boundaries of the constitutional space that any state polity may
lawfully occupy by imposing direct, binding limitations on the
content of state constitutions.2 6 Thus, no matter how earnestly a
state polity may desire them, a state constitution may not validly
contain provisions violating equal protection or due process, 27 or
limiting the privileges and immunities of American citizens from
other states, 28 or impeding in
interstate commerce,29 or establishing a
30 or erecting an aristocratic form of government, 31
state currency,
and so on. These restrictions place significant limitations on the
state polity's agency, limitations that are severely in tension
with the premises of constitutional positivism, especially the
requirement of political self-construction. Moreover, the partial
subordinacy of states in a federal system means that instructions
to the state government come from two different constitutions, state
and national, and by implication from two different polities, also
state and national. State governments thus serve two masters
simultaneously, violating constitutional positivism's uniqueness
requirement.
Another difficulty arises from the fact that, under the U.S.
Constitution, state polities are legally disabled from unilaterally
defining and constructing themselves. Article IV of the U.S.
Constitution provides specifically that new states may be admitted
into the union only with the permission of Congress, and prohibits
the creation of a new state within the territory of any other state
without the permission of the states concerned, as well as of
Congress. Furthermore, it is the Constitution of the United States,
and not of any state, that establishes the system of federalism in
26. For a comparative overview, see Robert F. Williams & G. Alan Tarr, Subnational
ConstitutionalSpace: A View from the States, Provinces,Regions, Ldnder, and Cantons, in
FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 3 (G. Alan Tarr et al. eds.,
2004).
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. See id. at art. IV, § 2.
29. See id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
30. See id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
31. See id.
32. See id. at art. IV, § 3.
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the first place, and it is to that decision of the national polity, and
not to the decision of any existing or putative state polities, that
states owe their existence. 3 The presence of these constraints
means that the decision to form a state, to say nothing of the
decision to include it in the federal union, is a decision made not by
the state polity in question, but jointly by the state and national
polities acting together. These considerations further undermine
both the uniqueness and self-construction requirements of constitutional positivism.
The problems with applying constitutional positivism to the
states, however, go deeper still. Although it is the reigning theory
of American constitutionalism, constitutional positivism is somewhat limited by certain Enlightenment-era assumptions about
human nature on which it is based.34 According to more recent
political theories that take a more realistic view of how constitutions function in the political and social world, constitutions are
more than sets of exogenously-generated instructions issued by
rationally self-constructed collections of individuals; they also form
a crucial part of the social matrix that shapes the individuals and
societies that live according to constitutionally decreed rules.3 5 In
other words, the arrow of causality points in both directions:
constitutions do not merely reflect political choices made by polities,
33. See SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 1-2, 20-21 (1993); WILLIAM P. MURPHY, THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM: STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 196-97
(1967).
34. Constitutional positivism derives from classic liberalism, which is often said to rely
on an unrealistically atomistic theory of individuals. See, e.g., Charles Taylor, Atomism, in
POWERS, POSSESSIONS AND FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF C.B. MACPHERSON 39 (Alkis
Kontos ed., 1979); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 9
(1982) (noting that in liberal theory, the individual is conceived to be "prior to and
independent of experience" and thus "prior to its ends").
35. This view is often associated with communitarianism. Leading works include
BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984);
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984); SANDEL,
supra note 34. It is also associated with the law and literature movement. See, e.g., JAMES
BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985);
JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM
(1990); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionistsand Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989). For examples of this view in state constitutional law specifically,
see Gardner, supranote 7, at 815-22; Schapiro, supranote 12, at 393 ('The constitution does
not reflect a preexisting community of value, but rather creates its own community.").
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but also in significant ways help to frame those choices by establishing a social context in which political preferences are conceived and
formulated. In this way, it is true not only that a people create a
constitution, but also that a constitution helps create a people.36
On this view, the fact that an American state polity must live not
only under its own state constitution but also under the national
Constitution has significant consequences for its identity. If a
constitution not only reflects but also reciprocally constitutes the
identity of the polity that lives under it, then the polity of an
American state is constituted simultaneously by both the state
and national constitutions. Since every state polity is partly
constituted by the U.S. Constitution, every state polity necessarily
shares to some extent the national polity's values, commitments,
and history-in short, its identity.
To make matters more confusing, this sharing of identity occurs
not only on the level of collective political identity, but on the
individual level as well. In the American political system, every
citizen of a state is also automatically a citizen of the nation," and
consequently all Americans are members simultaneously of both
their state and national polities. This dual social membership
necessarily contributes to a uniting, or at least a substantial
blurring, of the two identities, and suggests strongly that they are
mutually constraining through principles of individual personal
integrity. As the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has explained,
human life is embedded in narratives: we explain ourselves to
ourselves and to others, and from such accounts acquire our
identity.3" But because personal identity is based on an intelligible
narrative account of oneself, identity can never be wholly unconstrained; one's identity cannot be just anything one wishes it to be,
but rather is inevitably constrained by the bounds of narrative
plausibility: "personal identity is just that identity presupposed by
the unity of the character which the unity of a narrative requires.
36. See BENEDICTANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ONTHE ORIGINAND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 9-36 (rev. ed. 1991) (arguing that nations do not necessarily reflect
coherent preexisting communities, but rather result from collective leaps of imagination,
often stimulated by artifacts in the shared environment).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. See MACINTYRE, supra note 35, at 204-25.
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Without such unity there would not be subjects of whom stories
could be told."3 9 Because of this narrative drive toward unity in
personal identity, individual membership in distinct communities
becomes difficult to sustain the more communities are understood
to differ in important respects. One way to resolve this tension is to
choose between communities, 4 but where choice is not an option,
the only alternative is to attempt to hold things together by
intellectually minimizing the differences between the communities
to which one belongs. For Americans, this very likely means that
there are important social limitations on how different our state
and national communities, and thus our state and national
identities, can ever be.
If a constitution reflects the identity of the polity that creates it,
the identity of a state polity in a federal system is yoked in a
significant way to the national identity, and thus cannot differ
greatly from it. But this seepage of identity from state to nation and
from nation to state is in considerable tension with the premise of
constitutional positivism holding that the authors of a constitution
have a political identity that is determinate. In the American
system of federalism, it is difficult to tell where national identity
ends and state identity begins. Again, then, the more realistic
position is to conceive of state constitutions as the joint product of
the state and national polities.
To put the point another way, it may be possible to preserve
constitutional positivism as an interpretational methodology for
state constitutions, but only by radically reconceiving the nature of
the polity that creates them. Orthodox constitutional positivism
requires that we conceive of a state polity as a unique, voluntary,
distinct, and self-defined civil association, but that is clearly far
from accurate. If constitutional positivism is to be retained, it must
be adapted to recognize that the polity that makes a state constitution is fuzzy and ill-defined; its membership at any given moment
39. Id. at 218. Charles Taylor has made a similar argument. See CHARLES TAYLOR,
SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 27, 47-52 (1989).
40. This was the option chosen by Southerners upon seceding from the Union, and it was
typically justified on the ground that the differences between Southerners and the rest of the
nation had become too great. For an account, see James A. Gardner, Southern Character,
Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretationof State Constitutions:A Case Study in
ConstitutionalArgument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1252-55 (1998).
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includes elements of both state and national citizenries. Moreover,
the locus of the polity to which the state constitution is attributable
is not necessarily settled, as constitutional positivism requires, but
may wander between the two conventionally defined poles of state
and national citizenries, depending upon the particular issue or
constitutional provision in question. In a federal system, then, a
state polity simply is not a fixed, unique, and determinate entity, a
problem that greatly complicates the application of the methods of
constitutional positivism to the interpretation of state constitutions.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERPRETATION

The foregoing analysis permits us to draw some rough conclusions concerning the circumstances in which constitutional positivism is capable of furnishing a valid justificatory theory of
constitutional interpretation. First, constitutional positivism clearly
makes sense for national constitutions; they furnish the paradigm
case, and undoubtedly the foundational premises of constitutional
positivism make their closest approach to reality when a national
polity frames and lives under a national constitution. To invoke the
heuristic of ownership mentioned earlier, a national constitution
thus "belongs to" the national polity in the strongest possible way.
Second, in the case of subnational constitutions, constitutional
positivism makes the most sense at the extreme ends of the
spectrum of subnational autonomy referred to earlier. In a treaty
league or confederacy, where subnational units enjoy nearly
complete autonomy, constitutional positivism again furnishes a
good description of the relation between polity and constitution at
the subnational level. Here, because the subnational unit has a
degree of autonomy that approaches closely the autonomy enjoyed
by independent nations, the subnational constitution is created by,
and thus belongs to, the subnational polity-which is therefore the
source of the complete, or nearly complete, stock of constitutional
norms. In such a governmental structure, interpreters of the
subnational constitution may confidently apply the interpretive
prescriptions of constitutional positivism.
Conversely, at the other end of the autonomy spectrum,
subnational units are merely decentralized hierarchical subordi-
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nates of the national government; they lack any independent agency
and are bound to implement authority that is merely delegated
from the central government, much like an administrative agency.
Here, too, constitutional positivism furnishes a useful conceptual
framework, for it tells us that subnational constitutions in such a
system must be interpreted solely in light of national rather than
subnational norms and interpretational aids. In a highly centralized
system of governance, subnational governments are essentially
servants of the national government, so their constitutions will be
fully determined by norms established at the national level. The
subnational constitution, in other words, belongs to the national
polity.
In a federal system, however, neither subnational nor national
sources of meaning are likely by themselves to tell the whole story.
Because the state polity has considerable independent agency in a
federal system, subnational sources of meaning will clearly be
highly relevant to interpretations of the state constitution. At the
same time, however, national norms in such a system are part of
the constituting matrix of the state polity and, by implication, its
constitution; the state polity, as we have seen, cannot be neatly
separated from its national counterpart. Consequently, ownership
of a state constitution in a federal system is shared to some
degree, 4 and constitutional positivism is thus at its least effective
in describing the constitutional document and in prescribing a
suitable methodology of constitutional interpretation.
If constitutional positivism does not adequately capture the
situation of the American state constitutions, how, then, ought
such documents to be interpreted? This is not the place to attempt
a comprehensive answer,4 2 but it seems clear, if constitutional
positivism is to be preserved as a guide to interpretation, that it
41. The degree of sharing may differ from system to system. See, e.g., Martha A. Field,
The Differing Federalismsof Canadaand the United States, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107
(1992) (comparing the role of Canadian provinces and American states in their respective
federal systems). The degree of sharing may differ even from state to state within a single
federal system. See G. Alan Tarr, CreatingFederalism in Russia, 40 S. TEX. L. REv. 689, 689
(1999) (describing asymmetrical federalism in Russia).
42. I attempt a more complete, though still far from comprehensive, answer in a
forthcoming book, JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS:
JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (forthcoming 2005).
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must be adapted to take account of the fact that the state constitution is not solely a product of the state polity, but is rather the
outcome of more comprehensive processes in which both the state
and national polities participate. At a minimum, then, to interpret
a state constitution in these circumstances inevitably will require
at least some resort to national norms and sources of constitutional
meaning. Interpreters of state constitutions thus will need to search
for the meaning of the document not only in state sources of
meaning, such as the text and history of the state constitution, the
intentions of its framers, and the precedential decisions of state
courts, but also in corresponding national norms, history, experience, and precedent.
To look solely at state sources of meaning,43 as advocates of
strict constitutional positivism demand, is to exclude from the
analysis potentially useful or even critical information upon which
to base a meaningful interpretation of the state constitution. To
be sure, national sources of constitutional meaning may not always
significantly illuminate the meaning of the state constitution;
doubtless some provisions of state constitutions owe their contemporary meaning to influences and processes that are so overwhelmingly local that an examination of national history, precedent, or
values will yield little information of relevance." At other times,
however, national sources of constitutional meaning may, entirely
on their own, provide a complete and satisfying account of the
meaning of a provision of the state constitution, and in other cases,
the construction of a satisfactory account may require resort to
some combination of state and national sources of meaning. At
bottom, then, a sound approach to state constitutional interpretation requires a willingness to examine both kinds of sources, state
and national.45
43. Paul Kahn refers to this body of information as "unique state sources." Kahn, supra
note 11, at 1147-50.
44. See Pope, supra note 5, at 991-94 (identifying several instances in which state
constitution-making has been informed by deliberate and distinctive local choices).
45. A similar argument might be made about the interpretation of state statutes,
although it would be significantly more attenuated because legislative positivism rests on a
legitimating theory that is further removed from the identity-blurring problems that have
been discussed. According to the prevailing theory of legislative positivism, statutes are the
product of a duly appointed legislature possessing the delegated authority to make laws
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This is, of course, precisely what state courts already do. One of
the most common phenomena in state constitutional law is the
so-called "lockstep" interpretation, in which state courts construe
provisions of state constitutions to have precisely the same
meaning as similar provisions of the U.S. Constitution.46 In
conducting a lockstep analysis, or even in conducting more
sophisticated "adoptionist" analyses, in which federal constitutional
law is first consulted and then voluntarily incorporated into the
body of state constitutional law,47 state courts frequently examine
the text of the national Constitution, the founding history of the
national Constitution, and federal judicial decisions interpreting
the national Constitution. In so doing, state courts apparently
recognize that the meaning of the state constitution can be illuminated by looking to national sources of constitutional meaning. For
this they have been routinely criticized. My argument here
suggests, however, that this criticism may not be well founded.
IV. COMPLICATIONS
Having laid out my basic position, I now turn briefly to some
potential complications of my analysis. First, I want to clarify the
difference between the approach I have been defending and two
commonplace practices of American courts. The first of these
binding within the relevant political jurisdiction. In consequence, the touchstone for all
statutory interpretation is the intent of the legislature. Legislatures, however, are
emphatically not self-created, nor do they ordinarily suffer from structural ambiguities of
uniqueness or determinacy. It is conceivable that such problems could arise, but one would
expect them to result from some kind of political crisis rather than from a permanent
structural feature of the legislative system, as is the case with subnational constitutions in
a federal system. Nevertheless, one might still say that state legislatures partake of
ambiguities like those that characterize state polities, because the ambiguities that exist in
a state legislature's constitutional environment are necessarily ramified within the
legislature itself, so that the intentions of state legislators must occasionally be construed
by reference to national constitutional or statutory norms. Although there is something to
this argument, the furthest one might plausibly go in this direction would be to say that
national norms are relevant to the interpretation of state statutes only insofar as the
interpretation of a state statute requires examination of principles embodied in the state
constitution. In any other situation, the intentions of a state legislature are probably better
viewed, for all practical purposes, as a sufficiently strong intervening cause to overwhelm the
much more attenuated connections to national norms.
46. For an overview, see Williams, State Courts, supra note 9.
47. Id.
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practices occurs when courts interpreting one constitution consult
the decisions of other jurisdictions as an aid to interpretation. The
second practice involves the interpretation of what I call constitutional "wormholes": provisions in constitutions that deliberately
incorporate concepts or values developed by, and borrowed from,
other polities. In each of these situations, courts deliberately
examine the constitutional law of a jurisdiction other than the one
whose constitution they are construing, yet neither practice has
ever been thought to be inconsistent with the premises of constitutional positivism. I conclude by discussing the possibility of
including in a state constitution positive meta-instructions to the
judiciary to ignore "outside" sources of constitutional meaning.
A. Consulting Decisions from Other Jurisdictions
American courts have a long tradition of consulting related
rulings from other jurisdictions when analyzing issues arising
under the law of their own jurisdictions. Although the process of
interjurisdictional consultation is probably most familiar in
common law fields,48 where courts are free from the kinds of
decisional constraints imposed by the obligation to obey positive
law, it also occurs in constitutional law despite the fact that the
answers to constitutional questions are in principle to be found
exclusively within the four corners of the relevant constitution. 49 So,
for example, in taking up a question arising under the search and
seizure provisions of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court
might consider how state courts have construed similar provisions
of state constitutions, 50 and a state court facing a similar question

48. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence Baum, Patternsof Adoption of Tort Law
Innovations:An Application of Diffusion Theory to JudicialDoctrines, 75 AM. POL. ScI. REV.
975 (1981) (analyzing the pattern of diffusion of state judicial and legislative innovation with
regard to tort law).
49. I include here the set of unique interpretational aids conventionally associated with
every constitution, such as the founding history and Framers' intentions. Although it has
been persuasively argued that constitutional decisionmaking has much more in common with
common law decisionmaking than is generally recognized, see, e.g., David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996), that is a
complication I wish for present purposes to set aside.
50. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1961).

1264

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1245

might consult the constitutional search and seizure jurisprudence
of other state courts or of the U.S. Supreme Court. 5
This kind of interjurisdictional consultation, however, has not
typically been thought to be inconsistent with the principles of
constitutional positivism.5 2 Indeed, some of the leading exponents
of state constitutional positivism have maintained that there is no
basis for objecting to state judicial consultation of federal constitutional rulings, provided those rulings are given only the weight to
which their persuasive value entitles them. 3 But if constitutional
positivism permits this kind of routine interjurisdictional consultation, then doesn't constitutional positivism provide a suitable
method for interpreting state constitutions after all?
The answer is no: subnational constitutional interpretation in a
federal system contemplates a closer relationship between state
and national constitutional law than is captured in the kind of
interjurisdictional consultation approved by proponents of state
constitutional positivism. When state courts merely "consult"
similar decisions from other jurisdictions, they are conventionally
understood to be doing something optional, and the consulting court
51. Examples of both kinds of consultation appear in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586
A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (consultingboth state and federal rulings in determining whether to read
a "good faith" exception into the state constitution's protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures); State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991) (same). In its stronger forms, of course,
consultation shades into adoption, prompting complaints about lockstep analysis. See
Williams, State Courts, supra note 9, at _.
52. A recent exception is Justice Scalia's vociferous objections to the U.S. Supreme
Court's consultation of decisions from foreign jurisdictions in the course of construing the
federal Constitution. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 1, at 182 ("[I]f
a state court decides to conform its
interpretation of a state provision to the Supreme Court's interpretation of an analogous
federal provision, this decision has to be based on the persuasiveness of the Court's argument
.... "); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protectionof Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977) (suggesting that state judges should follow federal court
decisions "only if they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned"); Linde, E
Pluribus, supra note 6, at 179 ("Of course we pay attention and respect to Supreme Court
opinions on issues common to the two constitutions ...."); Linde, First Things First, supra
note 6, at 392 (quoting with approval a statement by the Hawaii Supreme Court in State v.
Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974), that U.S. Supreme Court decisions are "to be afforded
respectful consideration"); Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow, supra note 6, at 403
(noting that U.S. Supreme Court opinions are entitled to weight as "persuasive authority in
state constitutional interpretation," but observing that they deserve less weight than
"decisions of sister state jurisdictions').

2005]

WHOSE CONSTITUTION IS IT?

1265

typically considers itself equally free to attend to or to ignore the
consulted opinions; consultation, in other words, is not premised on
a belief that judicial rulings from other jurisdictions are in any
sense binding within the consulting jurisdiction. Rather, courts
seem to consult rulings from other jurisdictions more to educate
themselves than to inquire into any authoritative constraints on
how they themselves may rule. In consulting other decisions, then,
judges seek only to gain the benefit of relevant human experience
for the purpose of sharpening their own decision making; the
consulted ruling carries no more intrinsic weight than would, say,
a work of history or a law review article.
Once again, the point may be clarified by considering the
relationship between state and national constitutional law as
ranging across a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, state
constitutional law is completely controlled by the content of
national constitutional law, and state judges are thus required not
only to consult, but to follow national law because it fully determines the meaning of state constitutional provisions. This is the
kind of unreflective lockstep analysis that commentators have
properly criticized. The criticism is proper because, in a genuinely
federal system, the state polity has some degree of independent
agency in the formulation of its constitutional rules of self-governance and courts cannot assume, except upon the strongest
evidence, that the state polity has chosen entirely to forgo any
exercise of that agency.
At the other end of the spectrum, state and national constitutional law are completely independent, such that national
constitutional law has no formal relationship whatsoever to state
constitutional law; they are jurisprudential strangers. This is where
interjurisdictional consultation comes into the picture. Here,
state courts may educate themselves by consulting similar decisions
from other jurisdictions, but they are not required to do so, and
when they do consult such decisions they may do as they please
with whatever information they might happen to acquire. This is
the position taken by proponents of the primacy approach. This
position, however, simply makes a mistake that is the mirror image
of unreflective lockstepping, for it assumes, wrongly as I have
argued above, that a state constitution in a federal system is the
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product solely of the state polity. On this view, the national polity
has no agency in the construction of the state constitution, and the
national polity's constitution, history, identity, values, and judicial
precedents can therefore be treated as though they were entirely
external to the state constitution. Consequently, if consulting
federal decisions does happen to prove useful, that utility results
more from good luck and happenstance than from any systematic
structural relation between the two documents.
My argument here is for a middle position between these two
extremes. In a genuinely federal system, state constitutional law is
partly independent from national constitutional law, but also partly
dependent upon it. State courts cannot assume the identity of state
and national constitutional law because states are not administrative subdivisions of the national government, but neither may they
assume the kind of complete independence from national constitutional law that constitutional positivism requires because states in
federal systems are not fully independent sovereigns. As a result,
state courts must do more than merely "consult" federal constitutional law in the hope that such a chance encounter might yield
useful ideas or arguments. Instead, state courts must approach the
state constitution with the understanding that national constitutional law may, in many though perhaps not in all cases, provide
information necessary to comprehend its meaning. Resort to
national sources of constitutional meaning is, then, an integral part
of the process of elucidating the meaning of the state constitution,
not an optional consultation to be undertaken by judges who
happen to have the time and inclination.
B. Wormholes
Another instance in which constitutional positivism permits
judges to look to the constitutional law of other polities when
construing their own constitution is where the constitution in
question contains provisions that have been deliberately copied
from other constitutions.5 4 In these situations, it is often said that
the borrowed provision must be given the same meaning as it had
54. For a useful overview, see TARR, supranote 1, at 50-56.
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under the constitution from which it was borrowed at the time of
borrowing.5 5 The borrowed provision thus contains a constitutional
anomaly, a "wormhole" to another constitutional dimension: stick
your hand into this constitutional provision and it emerges
somewhere far away, in the constitutional universe of an entirely
different jurisdiction. For example, the framers of Article I, Section
6 of the Delaware Constitution, a provision protecting individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures, consciously copied it in
1792 from the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1791.56 As a result,
courts of Delaware to this day interpret the provision by looking to
decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court construing the
provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution from which the Delaware provision was borrowed.5 7
On the surface, this approach to borrowed provisions seems to
violate the uniqueness requirement of constitutional positivism
because it requires a court construing the borrowed provision to
consult the will of a polity other than the one to which it owes
constitutional obedience. In fact, however, the conceptual integrity
of constitutional positivism is preserved in these situations by
assigning to the founding polity itself responsibility for requiring
55. See, e.g., id. at 207 ("[O]ne chooses not only the text but the consequences of that
textual formulation, as indicated by the judicial decisions interpreting the text."). Sometimes
the much stronger (and untenable) claim is made that the borrowed provision must be
construed in tandem with the source provision even when the meaning of the source
provision evolves as a result of judicial rulings made in the source jurisdiction subsequent
to the borrowing. This position, however, results in a kind of constitutional lockstep that is
inconsistent even with the premises of constitutional positivism. See John M. Devlin, State
ConstitutionalAutonomy Rights in an Age of FederalRetrenchment: Some Thoughts on the
Interpretationof State Rights Derivedfrom FederalSources, 3 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST.
L. 195, 234-37 (1990); see also TARR,supranote 1, at 207 ("[N]o state can know how another
state will interpret a provision in the future, and the borrowing state is not bound by
whatever changes in interpretation might occur subsequent to ratification.").
56. See Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 860 n.12, 865-66 (Del. 1999).
57. Id. at 866. The Pennsylvania Constitution is also a source for some provisions of the
Kentucky Constitution, and decisions of the Pennsylvania courts construing the source
provisions carry special weight in Kentucky. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d
487, 498 (Ky. 1992). Even federal constitutional jurisprudence occasionally invokes a
wormhole jurisprudence. For example, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Seventh
Amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury trial to incorporate by reference the state of
the common law right to a jury trial as it stood at the time of the adoption of the Bill of
Rights in 1791. See Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935). The
Seventh Amendment is thus a wormhole that directs interpreters to the common law of the
eighteenth century.
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the interpreting court to look for the meaning of a constitutional
provision in the constitutional law of another jurisdiction.
Consequently, when a court of state A interprets a provision of A's
constitution by examining the constitutional text, history, framers'
intentions, and precedent of state B, it does so because the polity of
state A has so instructed it. Because the court is merely obeying the
binding instructions of the polity to which it owes obedience, it is
not violating, but is on the contrary complying with, the tenets of
constitutional positivism.
The problem that I have addressed in this Article, however, is not
simply a wormhole problem writ large. My argument is not that a
state court should look to national sources of constitutional
meaning because the state polity has instructed its courts to do so,
or should be understood tacitly to have permitted the use of
national sources. My point is rather that a state court attempting
to adhere to the protocol of constitutional positivism will in some
cases find it impossible to arrive at a complete and satisfying
understanding of certain provisions of the state constitution
without looking to national sources of constitutional meaning.
Reference to national sources is thus in many circumstances
required, regardless of whether the state polity has authorized it.
C. Meta-Instructionsto Ignore "Outside"Sources
The final complication I wish to address is the possibility that a
state polity might affirmatively forbid state courts to consult
national sources of constitutional meaning. That is, the state polity
might include in the state constitution meta-instructions to the
judiciary concerning how to interpret the document. What would
happen if such an instruction required state courts to interpret the
state constitution by relying solely on state sources of meaning,
such as the state constitutional text and history and the intentions
of the state constitution's framers, and to ignore national sources of
meaning? 8 Would this be sufficient to negate my analysis?
58. This is not a wholly speculative possibility. Provisions in the constitutions of Florida
and California, for example, require that certain rights guarantees in the state constitution
be construed solely in accordance with federal constitutional norms. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7;
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. Conversely, a different provision of the California Constitution and
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I think not. In fact, I think such an instruction would in many
cases prove impossible to obey because of the ambiguous identity
of the state polity, and would do nothing more than shift the locus
of ambiguity from one place to another. I argued earlier that the
unsuitability of constitutional positivism for the interpretation of
state constitutions is demonstrated by asking the question "whose
constitution is it?" A meta-instruction to ignore non-state sources
of constitutional meaning attempts to answer this question by fiat,
in essence by claiming: "this constitution belongs to us-the polity
of this state."
The general futility of attempting to solve interpretational
ambiguities by definitional fiat ought to be apparent. 9 In any event,
here the relevant ambiguity would simply be referred to the next
level of inquiry. Instead of asking "whose constitution is it?" the
court would have to confront different but equally intractable
questions: Who is the "you" of which the state polity consists?
Which sources of constitutional meaning are "yours" and which
are "theirs"? For example, would it be permissible for a state court
operating under such an instruction to consult the Declaration of
Independence? The Declaration is generally thought to be a
"national" source of constitutional meaning, but it so deeply
influenced the thinking of generations of drafters and ratifiers of
state constitutions that to exclude resort to it might seriously
compromise a state court's ability to make sense of certain provisions of the state constitution, or certain episodes in the state's
history, or certain important statements by the framers of the
state constitution. Thus, the challenge that federalism poses to
subnational constitutional positivism cannot be made simply to
a provision of the Rhode Island Constitution permit, but do not require, courts to construe
state constitutional rights provisions according to norms other than those informing the U.S.
Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 24.
59. The critical problem is that it is impossible for a principal, whether an individual, a
polity, or a legislature, to control by fiat the way in which its agents construe its instructions.
This is because interpretation always takes place in a context, and it is impossible for any
actor within that context to exercise complete control over the context in which it issues its
instructions, much less to control the way in which that context is understood and
interpreted by others acting within or upon it. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning
Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319 (1989). There is no need, however, to press this
position here, as the more modest argument given in the text is sufficient to rebut the
contention.
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disappear, but must be confronted at some point or another in the
process of interpreting state constitutions.
CONCLUSION

Constitutional positivism is a powerful and widely accepted
political theory of governmental and constitutional legitimacy, and
there are consequently good and tempting reasons to rely upon it
for the purpose of legitimizing judicial interpretation of constitu
tions. It is important, however, not to confuse the power of a theory
with its applicability; political theories derive their power in part
from their plausibility in the settings in which they are applied. In
particular, it is tempting to think that because constitutional
positivism supplies a plausible account of interpretational legitimacy for judicial review of the U.S. Constitution, it is capable of
doing the same for judicial review of American state constitutions.
But this appropriation rests on a faulty premise: it assumes,
wrongly, that constitutional positivism applies just as straightforwardly to subnational constitutions as it does to the paradigm case
of national constitutions. Although constitutional positivism may,
without modification, provide useful guidance for construing
subnational constitutions in certain kinds of multilevel systems of
governance, in a genuinely federal system it does not. This is
because subnational polities in a federal system lack several
characteristics that constitutional positivism deems them to
possess, making it an unsuitable method, at least in its conventional form, for application to the constitutions of the American
states.
Constitutional positivism can, however, be retrieved as a useful
methodology for interpreting state constitutions, but only by
relaxing some of its methodological prescriptions. In particular, we
must abandon the idea that the meaning of a state constitutional
provision is determined solely by reference to sources of meaning
associated with that constitution. Instead, interpreters of state
constitutions must recognize that elucidation of the meaning of
provisions of state constitutions may from time to time require
them to consult not only state sources of constitutional meaning,
but also corresponding national sources. That is, the meaning of the
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state constitution may be determined not only by the state constitutional text, state constitutional history, intentions of the framers of
the state constitution, and prior state constitutional precedent, but
also by the history, values, experience, and precedent associated
with the U.S. Constitution.
Despite a steady stream of academic criticism, state judges have
often looked to federal constitutional law to guide their interpretation of the state constitution. My analysis here suggests that
academic commentary would be better directed not to criticizing
state judges for resorting to national sources of constitutional
meaning, but rather to educating them about how best and in what
circumstances to do so.

